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 “DUTY-DEFINING POWER” AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT’S CIVIL DOMAIN 
Timothy Zick∗ 
 
Response to:  Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free 
Speech and Civil Liability, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1650 (2009). 
In Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,1 Daniel Solove and Neil 
Richards attempt something truly ambitious.  The authors seek to map 
coherent boundaries for the First Amendment’s vast civil domain.  Their 
project merits serious attention.  Currently, different rules apply to civil 
liability for speech depending on whether the liability arises in tort, 
contract, or property.  Solove and Richards claim that these boundaries 
are unworkable, under-theorized, and in some cases destined to collide.  
They develop a framework for mapping the First Amendment’s civil 
domain that is based upon a distinction regarding the type of power the 
state exercises in various civil liability contexts.  This response critically 
examines the choice and meaning of power, and the boundaries that a 
power-defining approach would draw. 
I.  CURRENT BOUNDARIES AND APPROACHES 
The boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil domain have not 
been systematically drawn.  The Court started mapping civil liability 
boundaries in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 owing to the unique First 
Amendment concerns raised by state libel laws.  From that point 
forward, there appears to have been no master plan.  Indeed, the 
present boundaries might well have been quite different.  With respect 
to access to certain private properties, for example, the Court was in 
favor of First Amendment applicability just a few years before it ruled 
against it.3 
 
∗
Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. 
1. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 
109 Colum. L. Rev. 1650 (2009). 
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
3. Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1968) (holding nonemployee union members had right to 
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As Solove and Richards observe, the current boundaries have not 
been adequately justified.4  Most tort claims seem to have been 
reflexively brought within the First Amendment’s domain, while most 
contract and property claims have remained beyond these borders.  As 
Solove and Richards note, however, civil liability boundaries often 
overlap and intersect.  For example, breach of confidentiality has both 
tort and contract characteristics.5  Which rule ought to apply? 
As the authors note, tort, contract, and property liability all may 
substantially affect expressive interests.  “Private” law, whatever its 
specific form, might dictate or distort public discourse, suppress the free 
flow of information, and limit opportunities for public exchange.  
Moreover, all civil liability emanates from the state.  By what logic or 
principle, then, are only certain claims to be excluded from the First 
Amendment’s civil domain? 
Solove and Richards do superb work culling various proposed 
answers to this question from existing shards of judicial reasoning and 
academic commentary.6  They contend, however, that each of the 
approaches is conceptually or theoretically flawed, and that none 
coherently explains the existing boundaries of the First Amendment’s 
civil domain.  Solove and Richards attempt to synthesize the vast 
landscape of civil liability under a single First Amendment framework.  
They urge that power be the new principal boundary marker.  The 
authors claim that the First Amendment is substantively applicable 
whenever “(1) the government defines the content of the civil duty; and 
(2) the speaker cannot avoid accepting the duty, or the government 
exercises undue power in procuring the speaker’s acceptance.”7  Claims 
that satisfy both elements of this definition are examples of the exercise 
of “duty-defining power,” which the authors contend merits serious First 
Amendment scrutiny.  All other civil claims arise from the exercise of 
“non-duty-defining power,” which does not trigger any First Amendment 
scrutiny.8 
Solove and Richards note that under this framework, the general 
boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil domain would be largely 
unchanged.  Thus, enforcement of most tort duties would continue to 
receive serious First Amendment scrutiny, while enforcement of most 
contractual duties would receive none.9  As explained below, the extent 
to which the power-defining approach would redraw the boundaries of 
 
peacefully picket on property owned by mall), with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 
(1976) (holding speakers had no First Amendment rights at private shopping center). 
4. See Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1652–54 (discussing cases of civil liability 
and free speech that have different outcomes under First Amendment).   
5. Id. at 1669–70. 
6. Id. at 1673–85 (discussing various approaches). 
7. Id. at 1692 (emphasis omitted).  
8. See id. at 1687–90 (explaining distinction between duty-defining and non-duty-
defining power). 
9. As noted infra Part III.B, the landscape with respect to property claims would be 
revised. 
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the First Amendment’s civil domain is debatable.  In any event, the 
authors’ principal goal is to offer a more coherent justification for both 
the boundaries that exist and for the treatment of claims located at the 
borders, where civil forms of action sometimes overlap and intersect. 
II.  AUTONOMY, CONSENT, AND STATE POWER 
Before turning to the power-defining framework, I want first to 
consider one of the approaches the authors reject—the “consensual 
waiver” approach.  Where a speaker voluntarily agrees not to speak, as in 
a confidentiality agreement, why should the First Amendment apply to 
the enforcement of that promise?  The speaker has a strong liberty 
interest in making such decisions.10  This liberty interest plausibly 
explains some portion of the First Amendment’s current civil landscape.  
In particular, it seems to solve the vexing puzzle of confidentiality claims.  
As Solove and Richards acknowledge, principles of consent and 
autonomy play a significant role in their power-defining framework.  
Indeed, the rather substantial influence of autonomy on the power-
defining framework (it affects both elements of the definition of “duty-
defining”) is such that one might wonder why a new approach grounded 
in “power” is necessary at all. 
Solove and Richards claim that the consensual waiver approach fails 
to take into account the rights of audiences to receive information.  But 
their approach might be subject to the same criticism.  Under the power-
defining approach, so long as private parties voluntarily negotiate 
expressive limits or enter relationships in which a duty of confidentiality 
is implicit, putative audience members have no cognizable First 
Amendment objection to the loss of what may in some cases be 
information of vital public concern.  As a theoretical matter, rejecting a 
pure autonomy approach at least allows for some consideration of 
audience interests.  As a practical matter, however, the switch to power 
would seem to benefit audiences only minimally, if at all. 
Solove and Richards also claim that the consensual waiver approach 
permits the state to effectively purchase silence from speakers.  Their 
example is a cash-for-silence contract, under which the government can 
purchase the suppression of criticism of its own policies.11  But as Solove 
and Richards note, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, such 
an agreement would be unenforceable.12  The state may, of course, 
attempt to purchase or coerce silence in more subtle ways.  The First 
Amendment is applicable, however, whenever the sovereign acts—
whether as regulator, subsidizer, purchaser, contractor, employer, or 
 
10. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that First Amendment 
protects “the right to refrain from speaking at all”).  See generally C. Edwin Baker, 
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989) (offering theory of free speech grounded 
in liberty and autonomy).  
11. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1690. 
12. Id. at 1690–91. 
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property owner.  Further, as the authors note, waivers of constitutional 
rights are strictly construed by courts.13  In other words, concerns 
regarding the exercise of “undue power” by the state are, to some 
extent, built into existing First Amendment doctrine. 
A pure autonomy approach helps to untangle the civil liability knot, 
specifically as it relates to the problem of confidentiality.  The principal 
weakness of the autonomy approach is its lack of comprehensiveness.  If 
the goal is to explain the relationship between free speech and civil 
liability in an expansive sense, principles of consent and autonomy only 
advance the project so far.  Autonomy principles shed important light on 
one region of the civil liability landscape.  They cannot justify or explain 
the remaining boundaries.  The question is whether a power-based 
approach, modified by principles of speaker autonomy, has greater 
explanatory power than an autonomy approach, modified by concerns 
regarding state power. 
III.  DUTY-DEFINING POWER AND CIVIL DISCOURSE 
As Solove and Richards observe, the object of line drawing in the 
civil liability context is to identify instances in which state-sponsored civil 
actions pose the greatest threat to free speech.  Mechanically and 
theoretically, “power” is better suited to this task than autonomy.  
Speech regulations are ordinarily viewed, often quite skeptically, 
through the prism of power.  And some civil liability, as the authors 
correctly note, is in essence a form of regulatory power.14  But it is not, as 
the authors suggest, the mere imposition of any mandatory duty 
regulating social conduct that seriously threatens the First Amendment.  
Rather, as is true with regard to any speech regulation, it is the character 
or substance of the duty that ought to determine the degree of the First 
Amendment threat.  This, ultimately, is what separates many tort and 
statutory speech rules from contract rules; it is also, as I will suggest 
below, one of the things that sets property-based liability apart from 
other forms of civil liability. 
A.  Civil Liability as Regulatory Power 
Solove and Richards note that civil liability is most troublesome 
from a First Amendment perspective “when it inhibits or tries to direct 
public discourse.”15  Accordingly, the authors are primarily concerned 
with “[t]he government’s role in shaping the speaker’s expression,”16 
specifically instances in which the state is “dictating, distorting, or 
 
13. Id. at 1677 n.149. 
14. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
782, 789 (1986) (“The Constitution speaks about freedom of speech, and liability rules 
can tread upon that freedom as much as direct regulation can.”).  
15. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1689.  
16. Id. 
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suppressing the terms or content of public discourse.”17  They seek to 
identify forms of government power that are “particularly dangerous and 
should be curtailed as abridgements of free expression.”18  This is the 
appropriate benchmark.  The question is whether the power-defining 
framework draws boundaries that faithfully track it. 
Solove and Richards convincingly establish that, as a function of 
speaker autonomy and consensual waiver, contractual claims that do not 
involve the exercise of undue state power or influence properly lie 
outside the First Amendment’s domain.  But that leaves a substantial 
landscape of tort and statutory liability.  Words are a potential basis for a 
staggering amount of civil liability.  The state imposes countless 
mandatory duties that have some impact on the act of speaking.  In 
addition to libel and privacy, common law duties imposed under assault, 
negligence, alienation of affections, interference with prospective 
economic advantage, and even trespass to chattels torts, all may 
incidentally impact speech.19  Under the power-defining framework, all 
of these actions, and presumably any others not based upon consensual 
waiver, are deemed “particularly dangerous” threats to public discourse 
and public debate.
20
  As a result, in common law actions the rule must 
either be altered, as in the case of libel, or courts must engage in ad hoc 
balancing.21 
This approach would formally constitutionalize substantial areas of 
the common law.  That would certainly be consistent with some recent 
trends, as evident in areas from punitive damages to prison litigation.  
But it bears emphasizing that Sullivan, from which this line-drawing 
exercise emanates, was an anomaly.  The presumption, as Richard 
Epstein has noted, “should be in favor of the constitutional permissibility 
of the common law rules.”22  On this view, the rules ought to be altered 
or displaced by constitutional principles only where truly necessary to 
preserve core First Amendment rights and values.  We ought to be 
looking, as the authors suggest, for the “cases where the government is 
using the civil liability system in ways that are especially dangerous.”23 
In drawing their boundaries, Solove and Richards have plainly 
opted for certainty over flexibility.  The authors are extremely skeptical 
of state power, so much so that irrespective of the particular content of 
the duty being imposed, they perceive a serious threat to public 
discourse.  Anyone who has struggled with the definitional and 
theoretical difficulties inherent in this area can appreciate their choice.  
Moreover, persuasive negative First Amendment justifications counsel 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1686. 
19. State and federal statutes, including employment and intellectual property laws, 
are also part of this landscape. 
20. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1686. 
21. Id. at 1696–97. 
22. Epstein, supra note 14, at 791. 
23. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1697. 
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skepticism of state power.24  There is no question that civil liability can 
and often does regulate the act of speaking.  The question is whether 
this form of regulation can generally be equated with state suppression 
of public discourse. 
Consider the great mass of potential tort claims.  One of the things 
that distinguishes tort from contract claims is that tort law consists of 
extrinsically imposed obligations or directives that specify “public norms 
of conduct.”25  The communicative torts—that is, those that regulate 
speech as a primary subject rather than one among many means of 
violating some general duty—are, as the courts have justifiably held, 
particularly dangerous to free speech.  As descendants of criminal 
speech provisions, their provenance alone provides some reason for 
special scrutiny.  Actions that permit the state, through judges and juries, 
to evaluate and ultimately define the boundaries of public civil discourse 
raise special First Amendment concerns.  Robert Post has described 
privacy torts, for example, as “civility rules” that define persons and 
communities.26  Some civil liability rules are committed to “the task of 
constructing a common community through the process of 
authoritatively articulating rules of civility.  The common law tort 
purports to speak for a community.”27  When they speak to the substance 
of public debate, civil liability rules deserve special scrutiny.  For similar 
reasons, we ought to be wary of civil claims like intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, which may facilitate suppression of something as 
critical to free speech as political satire. 
Absent some First Amendment scrutiny of these claims, 
governments would essentially be empowered, through the imposition of 
certain tort and statutory duties, to “maintain what they regard as a 
suitable level of discourse within the body politic.”28  A public civility 
code that rests upon common law or statutory claims is as threatening to 
the First Amendment as a campus speech code or a law that proscribes 
public utterance of derogatory or offensive words.29 
Not all mandatory duties pose this sort of threat, however.  For 
example, negligence law requires in many contexts that a person warn 
others of foreseeable dangers.30  Enforcement of a mandatory duty to 
warn “dictates” or compels speech.  Under the power-defining approach, 
 
24. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech:  A Philosophical Enquiry 86 (1982) 
(emphasizing deep distrust of government power to regulate expression). 
25. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 Geo. L.J. 695, 
755 (2003). 
26. Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains:  Democracy, Community, Management 
56 (1995). 
27. Id. at 67. 
28. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971). 
29. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670–71 (1973) 
(holding state cannot proscribe speech or conduct that is merely “offensive to good 
taste”). 
30. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) 
(holding psychotherapist has duty to warn third parties threatened by patients). 
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the defendant who fails to comply with a duty to warn would presumably 
be entitled to some First Amendment “defense.”31  But imposition of a 
duty to speak under these circumstances does not seriously threaten First 
Amendment values.  The duty to disclose or to warn not only aims to 
make us all safer, but creates a more informed citizenry with regard to 
certain hazards.  This particular duty, although mandatory and relating 
directly to the content of speech, does not seek to evaluate or define civil 
discourse, or “speak for” a community.  Nor does it implicate core First 
Amendment concerns regarding compelled belief or state ventriloquism. 
As the example shows, the character of the duty matters.  The duties 
we ought to be most concerned with are those that evaluate and define 
the substance of public discourse and debate.  We ought to be especially 
wary of these civil claims owing to the primary state interests they serve, 
namely protecting public audiences from uncivil speech and shielding 
persons from various dignitary harms associated with public disclosure.  
These purposes directly conflict with the individualism at the core of the 
contemporary First Amendment. 
It is not simply that some liability rules specify, in very general terms, 
“the content of duties that private actors owe to each other,”32 or that 
they create rules of social conduct that may impact speech, which poses a 
“particularly dangerous” First Amendment threat.  It is, rather, what 
some tort and statutory standards do—or are capable of doing—to 
individuals that marks them as serious threats to free speech.  Certain 
duties press and impinge upon speakers and speech in a manner and to 
a degree that others do not.  Some communicative or expressive duties 
aim principally to regulate what can be said to another.  Others specify 
how information can properly (“civilly”) be obtained and shared with 
the public.  These duties are not merely duty-defining; they are person-
defining and expressive community-defining in a much broader sense.  This 
is what renders defamation, false light, and privacy torts far more serious 
threats to free speech than the duty not to interfere with possession of 
one’s chattels, marital relations, or prospective economic advantages.  In 
the latter actions, moreover, speech often occurs in more private settings 
and is regulated not for its own sake, but as one means of accomplishing 
some other forbidden end.  It is thus difficult to characterize these forms 
of liability as “cases where the government is using the civil liability system 
in ways that are especially dangerous.”33 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that speech concerns are absent in 
any of these contexts.  But just as the authors would have contract law 
play the principal role in assessing “coercion,”34 courts could apply tort 
 
31. The defense would undoubtedly fail.  Indeed, Solove and Richards might argue 
for a categorical rule to that effect.  That adjustment may be warranted; but creating 
categorical rules cannot resolve questions regarding the accuracy or viability of the power-
defining approach. 
32. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1686. 
33. Id. at 1697 (emphasis added). 
34. See id. at 1701 (suggesting that coercion “would be an issue for contract law, not 
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and statutory liability in light of free speech concerns without holding 
the First Amendment fully “applicable” any time a mandatory duty is 
imposed.35  Where the common law or statutory duty is not itself 
constitutionally tainted, perhaps it would be best to allow states to 
experiment with, develop, or repeal doctrines that implicate speech 
concerns.36 
The power-defining framework improves upon the autonomy 
approach by asking what is unique, and uniquely threatening, about 
certain forms of civil liability.  We ought to conceive of “duty-defining 
power” as regulatory power that not only undermines or eliminates 
speaker autonomy, but authorizes an evaluative process by which the 
state dictates the substance of public discourse.  So characterized, duty-
defining power is a form of censorship or suppression that merits serious 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
B.  Property Lines 
When, as suggested above, we measure the substance of a duty 
against First Amendment values and concerns, the property lines drawn 
by the duty-defining approach seem somewhat incongruous.  The tort 
duty not to trespass onto the land of another is defined by the state, is 
mandatory, and may indeed affect speech.  Although they prohibit 
speakers from converting the private property of another into a speech 
forum, thus affecting the location of expression, property rules do not 
generally purport to evaluate or dictate the substance of public 
discourse.  If they are to be congruent, the First Amendment’s property 
lines ought to mark off places in which the state arguably has some duty 
to facilitate expression.  It is in such places that property exclusions pose 
the greatest threat to free speech. 
Solove and Richards reject the Hudgens rule, which holds that the 
First Amendment is not technically applicable on private properties.  
They contend that the First Amendment is also substantively applicable 
whenever a civil no trespassing duty is enforced.37  This means that a 
trespassing backyard or living room protester possesses a First 
Amendment interest in expressing herself in that location.  The authors 
are clearly uncomfortable with this result, which conflicts with significant 
residential privacy interests and the basic First Amendment principle 
that speakers do not have a right to convey messages “whenever and 
however and wherever they please.”38  They retreat to the position that a 
categorical rule, namely that the homeowner’s interests always outweigh 
 
the First Amendment”).  
35. See, e.g., Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 159 A.2d 216, 217 (Pa. 1960) (“Words in 
themselves, no matter how threatening, do not constitute an assault.”).  
36. See Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights:  The Woes of 
Constitutionalizing State Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173, 179 (arguing that 
constitutionalization of assault and other torts would be unwise). 
37. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1698–99. 
38. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (emphasis added).  
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the trespasser’s, may be appropriate.39  Notably, by contrast, their 
approach would permit those in gated communities, condominium 
associations, and other private associations to enact and enforce 
substantial speech restrictions by covenant or agreement.40  Putting aside 
which of these limitations is actually the greater threat to free speech,41 
the boundaries here seem anomalous; the trespasser in a private 
community would enjoy some level of First Amendment protection, 
while the residents of the community may enjoy none at all. 
Property is indeed critical to free speech.  The where of speech can 
be just as important as what may be said or how information may be 
disseminated.  But in terms of First Amendment values, not all places are 
of equal significance.  The greatest threats to free speech in terms of 
property rules are the public forum and time, place, and manner 
doctrines, which have resulted in increasingly diminished opportunities 
for expression and exchange even in traditional public forums.42  The 
First Amendment is undoubtedly both technically and substantively 
applicable to regulations of public expression in these places; the 
problem lies in the balance that has been struck between state and 
speaker interests. 
Solove and Richards correctly reject the traditional state action 
frame, which obscures more than it elucidates, with regard to private 
properties.  The more appropriate question, as Mark Tushnet has 
recently observed, is whether the government has a substantive duty to 
provide or protect the right in question.43  With respect to properties 
that are generally open to the public, tend to be heavily subsidized by 
the state, and facilitate access to large public audiences, one could 
plausibly argue that government has a duty to facilitate and protect 
expressive rights.  Exclusion from quasi-public venues like large 
shopping centers, which have replaced the town squares and public 
streets speakers have largely abandoned or been displaced from, poses 
the greatest threat to the First Amendment.  Increasingly, it is only in 
such places that significant public audiences can be found.44  With 
regard to these properties, trespass enforcement may well be “duty-
defining,” in the sense that it suppresses public discourse on a 
substantial portion of our expressive topography.  By contrast, backyards 
and living rooms are not significant speech venues; restricting access to 
 
39. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1698–99. 
40. See id. at 1700–01 (discussing restrictive residential covenants).  
41. See Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors:  Preserving First Amendment Liberties 
in Public Places 159–61 (2008) (discussing free speech implications of “gated 
communities” and other forms of privatization). 
42. See id. at 53–59 (criticizing “judicial bureaucratization” of public places). 
43. Mark Tushnet, State Action in 2020, in The Constitution in 2020, at 69, 70 (Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009) (“[T]he state-action doctrine is not really about 
what the state does, but what it has a duty to do.”). 
44. See N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 
779 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing, under state constitution, that “if the people have left for the 
shopping centers, our constitutional right includes the right to go there too, to follow 
them, and to talk to them”). 
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such places has little to do with public debate.  The state has no duty to 
extend speech protections over backyard fences or through front doors. 
Property-based duties not to trespass on, interfere with, or convert 
private property certainly “shape social conduct in ways defined by the 
state.”45  But as with the duty to warn, this is not sufficient to render the 
First Amendment fully applicable.  The substance of these duties, which 
protect against interference with possession or use of real property and 
chattels, seems rather far removed from concerns regarding state 
censorship or suppression of speech.  That is not to say that no First 
Amendment concerns arise where property rules exclude speakers from 
preferred venues.  But again, there are ways to address such concerns 
short of imposing First Amendment standards on all private properties.46 
CONCLUSION 
 Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability will enhance critical thinking 
about the boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil domain.  The 
power-defining approach is an impressive attempt to blend principles of 
state power and speaker autonomy into a coherent and workable 
formula.  Solove and Richards successfully untangle the confidentiality 
knot.  Their approach resolves difficult borderline cases in which 
different standards sometimes collide.  It is determinate without, as the 
authors show through various examples, being rigidly categorical.  
Moreover, by focusing on power, Solove and Richards remind us that 
some liability rules can be as dangerous to free speech as ordinary laws 
and regulations.  I have raised questions about the extent to which we 
ought to constitutionalize speech-related civil actions.  But disagreement 
with regard to where the boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil 
domain ought to be drawn is perhaps inevitable with a project of this 
scope.  Solove and Richards may not have drawn perfect boundaries.  
But the lines they have drawn, and more importantly the reasons for 
them, are more coherent and determinate than those that currently 
exist. 
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45. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1686. 
46. Courts might, for example, tighten the requirements for a prima facie case where 
speech concerns are present.  See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303–04 (Cal. 
2003) (requiring recipient of noncommercial spam email to prove actual damage to 
computer to state trespass to chattels claim). 
